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Abstract 
I argue that silencing (the act of preventing someone from communicating, broadly construed) can 
be an act of both interpersonal and institutional violence.  My argument has two main steps. First, 
I follow others in analyzing violence as violation of integrity and show that undermining 
someone’s capacities as a knower can be such a violation. Second, I argue that silencing someone 
can violate their epistemic capacities in that way. I conclude by exploring when silencing someone 
might be morally justifiable, even if doing so is an act of violence. 
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Introduction  
 
Few words carry more normative weight than ‘violence’ and many of those that do imply 
violence themselves.1 It is important, then, for those concerned with acting rightly or promoting 
social justice to think through the ways in which violence is done. Especially important for 
theorists is to help shine a light on those types of violence that might be easy to overlook. In this 
chapter I aim to do just that by focusing in particular on epistemic violence – the way in which 
violence might be done to someone in their capacity as a knower. Specifically, I focus on the claim 
that silencing can be an act of epistemic violence. Consider four cases involving silencing: 
 
Case 1 – Campus Protests of a Racist Speaker 
 
A speaker has been invited to give a lecture on a college campus. Their views are well-
known and are considered by many to be racist (promoting the view, for instance, that black 
people are inherently more violent than white people). Student protesters rally against the 
speaker, write op-eds, hold protests, and threaten various forms of civil disobedience 
should the speaker be allowed to present. As a result, the campus withdraws its invitation. 
Alternatively, the speaker does come to campus but is unable to give their lecture because 
student protests noisily disrupt them, making it difficult for the speaker to be heard. 
 
                                               
1 Many thanks to Annaleigh Curtis, Tyler Hildebrand, Emily Saari, Kayleigh Doherty, Jason 
Wyckoff, Fiona Maeve Geist, Martin Armstrong, Shane Gronholz, Audrey Yap, Chris Blocher, 
Mark Lance, Rosa Terlazzo, Michael Doan, Michelle Panchuk, Kelly Weirich, and three 
anonymous referees for their invaluable critiques and insight. 
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Case 2 –Sexism in Class 
 
Students in a college class use sexist language, make sexist jokes, or argue that women are 
inherently bad at the discipline in which the class is situated. Because of the role that sexist 
stereotypes have played historically, and because of the social meaning that such language, 
jokes, or arguments have in contemporary society, it becomes extremely difficult for some 
women in the class to take part. 
 
Case 3 – Smartphone App 
 
A smartphone app allows users to post anonymous comments within a geographically local 
area. At first, students on a college campus use the app to post about parties and to complain 
about exams. Over time, students begin posting homophobic comments on the app, using 
anonymity as a cover for expressing what would otherwise be widely condemned beliefs. 
After deliberation, the college bans the use of the app on its network, forcing students to 
use their personal cell phone plans to access it and thereby effectively shutting down the 
app’s local network. 
 
Case 4 – Employee 
 
An employee at a company writes and circulates a memo in which they argue against the 
value of affirmative action and diversity within the industry. Upon learning of the memo, 
managers of the company fire the employee. Alternatively, an employee is fired from a 
company when it is discovered that they took part in a neo-Nazi rally. In both cases the 
employee is fired, not for overtly failing to do their job, but because the views that they 
expressed were inconsistent with the core values of the company. 
 
Cases like these have recently appeared in the news in the United States. All bear on a 
larger conversation about what the right to free speech means and whose speech it should protect. 
In this project I will leave many aspects of that conversation to the side. Instead, my purpose here 
is to explore both the concepts of violence and silencing, as well as the claim that silencing can be 
an act of violence, in order to make that conversation more productive. I will argue that silencing 
is sometimes a form of epistemic injustice that can result in the violation of the integrity of the 
person who is silenced by diminishing their epistemic capacities. In those cases where such 
violation occurs, silencing becomes an act of violence. 
I will proceed as follows. In section 1 I will adopt and develop a particular definition of 
violence, laying out broadly what conditions must be met for something to count as violence. In 
section 2 I will analyze silencing as a form of epistemic injustice before going on to argue that 
silencing can indeed be an act of violence. In section 3 I will explore when someone ought to 
silence another, even if doing so is an act of violence. 
 
1. What is Violence? 
 
‘Violence’ is used to refer to many things. In the Western philosophical literature, it has 
primarily been used to refer either to intentional, excessive physical force or to the violation of 
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morally considerable objects like persons, personal property, or non-human animals.2 The main 
problem with the former is that it excludes some things we might want to call violence (like 
psychological or institutional violence).3 The main problem with the latter is that it includes too 
much, and by understanding violence as violation we run the risk of watering down the term’s 
meaning.4 
In this project my goal is not to reinvent the wheel, nor is it give a full-throated defense of 
either account of violence. Instead, my project is to adopt the second definition and then expand it 
in order to make sense of the claim that silencing can be an act of violence. In doing so I will 
ultimately adopt Vittorio Bufacchi’s definition of violence as violation of integrity. First, in order 
to illuminate both Bufacchi’s definition and my subsequent application, it will be helpful to review 
Newton Garver’s classic account of violence (from which Bufacchi borrows). 
Garver argues that violence can be overt or covert, personal or institutional. What is 
common to each is not force but violation, and not just violation of any type of object, but the 
violation specifically of a person.5 Since ‘person’ is a metaphysically robust concept, and for 
Garver violence is fundamentally about violating persons, violence itself should be understood to 
be similarly robust. Persons, after all, are more than their physical bodies; they also have at least 
some of the following: beliefs, desires, interests, self-awareness, the capacity for sensory 
experience, as well as the capacity to plan for and anticipate the future. Perhaps most important 
for Garver is that persons have a will; in having a mind with desires and interests, as well as the 
ability to plan for the future, persons are able to work to bring about for themselves one future 
rather than another.  
On Garver’s view, violence can be done to persons in three ways. The first is by violating 
the body of a person; this is straightforward physical violence, where someone’s bodily integrity 
is undermined.6 The second is by violating the dignity of a person.7 This is best understood as a 
violation of another’s autonomy; that a person has essentially the capacity to make decisions and 
choose one option over another means that when another violates their ability to choose, they don’t 
merely undermine or thwart their choice, but what it is even to be a chooser in the first place. 
Finally, the third method of violence on Garver’s view is violating the freedom of a person to do 
what they would actually choose to do. 
Bufacchi refines and moves beyond Garver’s view when he develops this definition: 
“An act of violence occurs when the integrity or unity of a subject 
(person or animal) or object (property) is being intentionally or 
unintentionally violated, as a result of an action or an omission. The 
violation may occur at the physical or psychological level, through 
physical or psychological means. A violation of integrity will 
usually result in the subject being harmed or injured, or the object 
being destroyed or damaged.”8 
                                               
2 For a helpful overview of the different views of violence that can be found in the literature, see 
Bufacchi 2005. 
3 Bufacchi 2005, 198. 
4 Ibid., 197. 
5 Garver 1968, 819. 
6 Ibid., 819. 
7 Ibid., 819.  
8 Bufacchi 2007, 43-44. 
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Bufacchi argues that Garver’s analysis of violence is too exclusive, since it precludes the 
possibility of doing violence to non-persons (most notably, to non-human animals). That’s one 
reason why it is helpful to broaden the definition to focus specifically on violations of integrity.9 
By ‘integrity’ Bufacchi means to use the term “in a non-philosophical sense,” and to refer to 
“wholeness or intactness,”10 “’unity,’ or the quality or state of being complete or undivided.”11 
Persons, like bridges and skyscrapers, have an integrity that can be undermined, causing them to 
fracture, become unstable, or to collapse altogether. And, since non-human animals and personal 
property have an integrity that can be degraded or destroyed, they can be the object of violence as 
well. 
I contend that Garver’s analysis is also too inclusive, in so far as he claims that thwarting 
the freedom of a person to act as they would is a type of violation. This casts the net too wide, 
since it would allow all efforts to prevent another from achieving their chosen ends to count as 
violence. For instance, if a parent secures a cabinet with a child-proof lock to prevent their toddler 
from getting into the toxic cleaning supplies, though they have thwarted their child’s ends, they 
have not done violence to them. That said, there is something to Garver’s third type of violation. 
In particular, it helps to make sense of the claim that threats are a form of violence, since what you 
do when you threaten someone is attempt to constrain their freedom and force them to comply 
with your will. It also helps to make sense of the claim that violence can be institutional. If some 
background social structure systematically thwarts someone’s choices over time it does violence 
to them. And, cutting now in the other direction and returning to the interpersonal, if a domineering 
parent routinely and habitually undermines their child’s decisions, not as they do when they 
prevent a toddler from drinking poison (which ultimately promotes the child’s freedom) but in a 
way that leaves them in a state of constant frustration, it makes sense to say that they do violence 
to their child. 
This helps to illuminate a crucial insight to Garver’s project. Though Bufacchi is right to 
want to build a more inclusive definition than Garver (since it seems clear that violence can be 
done to non-persons), Bufacchi is also right to follow Garver in recognizing that there is a type of 
violence that can be done uniquely to persons. In such a case it is someone’s “integrity as a person 
that is infringed, since in the process of being violated one is reduced to a lesser being, in physical 
and/or psychological terms.” (Emphasis added.)12  
Susan Brison develops a similar understanding of violence. Throughout her extraordinary 
book Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of the Self, she explores in light of her own experience 
of violence what it is for a person to be “undone, demolished, shattered, and destroyed.”13 Like 
Garver, Brison argues that one method of causing such destruction is to undermine the autonomy 
of another. Since one characteristic of personhood is the capacity for autonomy, one method of 
violating persons is to undermine that capacity. When someone violates another’s ability to choose, 
they don’t merely thwart the person’s choice, but undermine what it is to be a chooser in the first 
place. That will often come about as a result of being routinely and systematically prevented from 
                                               
9 The other reason Bufacchi gives is that Garver’s account ultimately is concerned with the 
violation of a persons’ rights “that are essential to personality,” rather than the violation of 
persons themselves. Ibid., 41. 
10 Ibid., 40. 
11 Ibid., 41. 
12 Ibid., 41. 
13 Brison 2002, 25-26, 40, 110. 
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exercising one’s autonomy but can also be the result of isolated, traumatic actions.14  
Because my task is to explore the claim that silencing can be an act of violence, and since 
I take persons to be the only types of objects that can be silenced, for the remainder of this project 
I will use ‘violence’ to refer to the violation of the integrity of persons in particular. A person’s 
integrity can be violated both physically (by destroying someone’s body you violate not just their 
physical form but also their capacity to choose) and non-physically.15 I am here modifying the 
traditional distinction between physical and psychological violence; by contrasting the physical 
with the non-physical (rather than psychological) we are able to recognize types of violations of 
integrity someone might suffer that are not bodily, but also that are not straightforwardly 
psychological. Specifically, I want to consider epistemic violence, in which a person is violated in 
their capacity as a knower. 
Physical and non-physical violence can be carried out both interpersonally (where one 
person violates the integrity of another) and institutionally (where some institution or social 
structure violates the integrity of a person or group of persons). Institutional violence can occur 
independently of particular actors, which is to say that it is a part of the fabric of society and is not 
necessarily intentional or aimed at by those who designed the laws, policies, or institutions in 
question.16 Understood in this way, social structures can cause violence, even if they leave no 
physical marks on their victims, and even if there are no clear perpetrators that can be held 
responsible for their harms. 
Importantly, the account of violence on which I will rely is an outcome-based model of 
violence, which is to say that whether something is an act of violence is determined by whether its 
outcome includes the violation of the integrity of a person, rather than by determining in advance 
(by way of intention or how the act is performed) whether it so qualifies. In this way my approach 
aims to start from the standpoint of the victim, asking what happened to them, rather than the 
perpetrator, asking what they intended to do or how they intended to do it.17 In short, when a person 
or social structure violates the integrity of a person or group of persons, violence has been done. 
At the same time, one might commit an action violently, even though the action does not 
itself qualify as violence. Bufacchi notes that it is helpful to distinguish the adverb ‘violently’ from 
the noun ‘violence,’ where the latter refers to what action was committed and the former refers to 
how the action was committed.18 It makes sense to say that someone performed an action violently 
even if they did not cause violence in so acting (as when someone with the flu coughs violently), 
just as it makes sense to say that they caused violence even if they did so via what would typically 
be taken to be non-violent means (as when someone accidentally poisons another by unknowingly 
serving them food to which they are seriously allergic). In short: if someone shoots a gun at another 
and misses they have acted violently though they have not committed an act of violence since they 
                                               
14 See Susan Brison’s discussion of the way in which a single act of violence can undermine 
one’s autonomy. Brison 2002, Chapter 3. 
15 Garver 1968, 820. 
16 For more on the concept of structural violence, see Galtung, 1969. Johan Galtung uses the 
term ‘structural violence,’ where Garver uses the term ‘institutional violence.’ Both ‘institutional’ 
and ‘structural’ have been used in a variety of ways in different literatures, and though they 
might imply different degrees of formality, design, or agency, I use the terms interchangeably 
here. 
17 Bufacchi 2005, 199. 
18 Bufacchi 2007, 16. 
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did not violate the integrity of the person they were attempting to harm.  
This distinction might seem strange; after all, actions like firing guns at people seem 
intrinsically violent, so why should we need to determine their outcomes in order to assess whether 
they are acts of violence? That strangeness is diminished when we note two things. First, though 
actions committed violently often cause violence they do not always do so, a fact that is easier to 
recognize when we consider attempted but unsuccessful acts more generally. Just as it makes sense 
to say that someone committed attempted (rather than successful) burglary, so too does it make 
sense to say that they committed attempted (rather than successful) violence. Second, part of the 
reason why the outcome-based account of violence may appear problematic is that it might seem 
to suggest that the actor who tries but fails to do violence (though they do act violently) does not 
act wrongly. But, just as we can hold someone morally responsible for attempted burglary, so too 
can we hold someone responsible for attempted violence. The same is true for acts that do not aim 
at violence but could foreseeably cause it. In other words, the strangeness of distinguishing 
between acting violently and committing an act of violence is diminished in light of the fact that 
we already frequently draw that distinction (when distinguishing between attempted and successful 
acts), as well as when we recognize that whether (and to what degree) someone should be held 
morally responsible is a different question from whether they committed an act of violence or 
performed an act violently. 
Putting these pieces together it becomes clear that the world contains considerably more 
violence than is typically recognized.19 One might be troubled that this analysis of violence is 
much more inclusive than ordinary uses of the term imply. As I said at the outset, my project here 
is not to argue for this analysis of violence but instead to adopt it in order to make sense of the 
claim that silencing can be an act of violence. I do believe, however, that this more expansive 
analysis is helpful because it focuses on the underlying moral issue that we should care about in 
many cases of harm, wrongdoing, or injustice. Killing, physical assault, and rape all involve a 
violation of a person’s bodily integrity. Threats, coercion, exploitation, being Otherized or treated 
with disrespect, can all involve violation of a person’s will, of their dignity or sense of self, or of 
their social status or position. And, as I will argue, silencing can involve violations of a person’s 
epistemic capacities, thereby undermining or diminishing their ability to serve as a giver and 
receiver of knowledge, and short-circuiting their ability to interpret the world in a way that is 
meaningful and that fits with their experience. In short, part of what is valuable about the analysis 
of violence as violation of the integrity of a person is that it elegantly identifies an important and 
unifying feature of many of the serious harms that can be inflicted on others. It also is consistent 
with Brison’s testimony as a survivor of violence as well as her analysis as a philosopher. It seems 
both analytically and practically useful, then, to tie a term as normatively laden as ‘violence’ to 
that underlying feature. If, however, you object to this definition you may simply substitute 
‘violation of the integrity of a person’ for ‘violence’ throughout the rest of this chapter, since I will 
take the latter to refer to the former. 
 
                                               
19 For instance, advertising that bypasses consumers’ agency might, over time, diminish their 
capacity for free choice. Consumers would thereby be subjected to violence, on my view. Some 
might object to this outcome on the grounds that it is too inclusive. For my part, I think it helps 
to reveal part of what’s problematic about a consumerist society. Thanks to Rosa Terlazzo for this 
helpful example. 
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2. What is Silencing? 
 
Employing Garver’s taxonomy of violence, silencing can occur interpersonally or 
institutionally, overtly or covertly. Here are some examples of the way that silencing plays out in 
all four senses (though this list is far from exhaustive).20 
 
Overt Interpersonal - If one person physically restrains another (putting their hand over 
the other’s mouth), or disables their access to the internet or social media, or constantly 
talks over them such that they are never able to effectively communicate their view, they 
have silenced the other overtly.21 
 
Covert Interpersonal – If one person in conversation with another constantly rolls their 
eyes, responds patronizingly, or fails to pay attention to the speaker, who then stops 
speaking rather than suffer such continued disrespect, they have silenced the other covertly. 
 
Overt Institutional – If the state passes a law that prevents its citizens from 
communicating with each other – if it blocks social media or shuts down the free press – 
the state has silenced its people overtly by thwarting their ability to communicate in the 
first place. Or, if the state passes a law that allows only a particular social group to vote, all 
other groups have been overtly silenced institutionally. 
 
Covert Institutional – If the state enacts various types of voter suppression, making it 
more difficult and costly for citizens to vote in an election and thereby discouraging 
communication of their political will, then the state has silenced its people covertly. Or, if 
a dominant ideology or features of a culture train members of a particular social group not 
to attempt to communicate or even to have a view in the first place, members of that group 
have been covertly, institutionally silenced.22 
 
In short, I take silencing to occur when someone is prevented from communicating.23 Such an 
                                               
20 Thanks to Annaleigh Curtis for helping me think through these examples. 
21 Note that killing someone or physically injuring them in a way that leaves them unable to 
communicate are also instances of silencing (though that will very likely be the less morally 
serious wrong in most cases). 
22 For more on the ways in which culture might lead to violence, see Galtung, 1990. 
23 There is an important difference between feeling silenced and being silenced. Our beliefs can 
make up an essential part of who we are. It is therefore easy to feel injured or deeply wounded 
when one’s beliefs are challenged, ridiculed, or when they fail to secure uptake. It is very often 
true that our feelings are a good guide to what has happened to us, but it is not always so. In the 
case of silencing, precisely because we identify with our beliefs, and in particular with the beliefs 
that are likely to be silenced, it is easy to overstep our assessment and feel as though we have 
been silenced when we have not. Imagine that someone is at a holiday dinner with their family 
and expresses an unpopular political opinion. In arguing for their view the person’s family 
actually hears them out, understands both their conclusion and the reasons the person gives in 
support of it, but ultimately does not change their minds. The person might report feeling 
silenced – “No one ever listens to me!” – but was not. On the other hand, if someone elderly is 
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outcome can be brought about more or less overtly by both individuals and institutions or social 
structures. As with violence, we should adopt an outcome-based account of silencing; we 
determine whether someone has been silenced by determining whether they have been prevented 
from communicating. (Consider a case where the state tries (but fails) to shut down the press or 
where one person tries unsuccessfully to talk over another at the dinner table; such cases would be 
instances of attempted but unsuccessful overt institutional and interpersonal silencing, 
respectively.) 
This definition is more inclusive than those generally defended in the literature. Though 
Rae Langton grants that one way to silence someone is to “prevent them from speaking at all,”24 
she is concerned primarily with the ways in which someone might be silenced even though they 
are able to express themselves. Jennifer Hornsby and Langton later defend what has come to be 
the go-to definition of silencing, which says that someone is silenced when their illocutionary 
intention in communicating is prevented systematically from securing uptake by their intended 
audience.25 Mary Kate McGowan argues that silencing also happens not only when someone’s 
illocutionary intention fails to secure uptake, but when a speaker’s sincerity – whether they mean 
what they are saying - in performing a particular speech act fails to secure uptake.26 Kristie Dotson 
outlines two particular types of silencing, what she calls testimonial quieting and testimonial 
smothering, both owing to pernicious ignorance on the part of the intended audience. Testimonial 
quieting “occurs when an audience fails to identify a speaker as a knower.”27 Testimonial 
smothering occurs when “the speaker perceives one’s immediate audience as unwilling or unable 
to gain the appropriate uptake of proffered testimony.”28 My definition is compatible with each of 
these accounts – it recognizes all of them as silencing – but it also includes additional forms of 
silencing that these authors might omit, since, for instance, my view does not entail that silencing 
be grounded in pernicious ignorance, that it be systematic, or that it be focused in particular on the 
intended audience’s behavior (though many instances of silencing might entail all three 
conditions).  
Have I cast the net too wide? One reason for accepting a more inclusive definition of 
silencing is that it better syncs up with ordinary usage. Consider Case 1 with which I began. In the 
current political climate in the United States, talk of silencing on college campuses is common. 
When student protesters disrupt or cause public lectures to be canceled, those speakers (and those 
commenting on the events) have often claimed that they were silenced. And, in many cases 
preventing the speaker in question from communicating what students anticipate will be morally 
repugnant views is exactly what the protestors aim to accomplish. This is overt, interpersonal 
silencing. Or, consider Case 2, in which students in a college class make sexist jokes or appeal to 
sexist stereotypes that thereby make it difficult for women in the class to take part. This is covert, 
interpersonal silencing.29 Next, consider Case 3, in which a college blocks the use of a particular 
                                               
being cared for by their family, but they are never listened to when they report feeling a certain 
pain or experiencing inadequate or harmful care in their retirement community, the person would 
both feel silenced and actually be silenced.  
24 Langton 1993, 299. 
25 Hornsby and Langton 1998, 21. 
26 McGowan 2014, 460. 
27 Dotson 2011, 242. 
28 Ibid., 244. 
29 Things are a bit tricky here, because in such a case stereotypes would not have their meaning 
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smartphone app on its network on the grounds that it was being used to communicate homophobic 
beliefs. This is overt, institutional silencing. Finally, consider Case 4, in which a company fires its 
employee for communicating racist or sexist beliefs. In this case the company does not silence the 
employee; that they were able to communicate their views is what led to them being fired. Instead, 
the company sends a message that others who express such views will also be sanctioned. This is 
covert, institutional silencing. 
  Another reason to adopt a more inclusive definition is not only that it better tracks 
contemporary, ordinary usage, but also that it better captures the underlying component that runs 
throughout many of the analyses that can be found in the literature. Hornsby and Langton, for 
instance, are fundamentally concerned with the disruption of communication, and focus on how 
misogynist ideology (and the prevalence of pornography in particular) undermines the way in 
which women are able specifically to communicate that they do not consent to sex.30 In contrast 
with Hornsby and Langton, Rebecca Kukla explores what she calls discursive injustice, in which 
(moving beyond a focus on silencing) the performative force of a speaker’s speech act is distorted, 
owing to the background context in which they are attempting to communicate.31 What is common 
throughout the literature is that the attempt to communicate is thwarted, either because the person 
to whom the communication is aimed fails to do their part (either intentionally or unintentionally), 
or because the background context is such that communication itself is difficult or impossible. 
Consider again Case 4: in firing the employee the company communicates to others that the 
background conditions within which they might express themselves are such that, should they 
express certain types of views that are inconsistent with the company’s values, they will lose their 
jobs. Though these background conditions are not as covert as those detailed by Hornsby and 
Langton and by Kukla, they help set the terms within which communication can take place (and 
so also create the circumstances in which silencing can occur). 
For both of these reasons, then, I contend that we should accept a broad definition of 
‘silencing.’32 Like violence, we should adopt an outcome-based account of silencing, in which we 
determine whether someone was silenced in light of whether they were prevented from 
communicating. It then makes sense to reach the judgment that people were silenced in all four of 
the cases I named at the outset. The question I now want to engage is whether such silencing should 
ever be considered violence. 
 
3. Is Silencing an Act of Violence? 
 
Miranda Fricker argues that essential to one’s identity as a person is one’s identity as a 
                                               
without a sexist ideological backdrop; in that way the case seems to be more like covert 
institutional silencing. But, because one particular person prevents another from communicating 
by telling a joke that relies on that backdrop, the other is silenced. Though I take the distinction 
between the four methods of silencing to be helpful, I don’t mean to suggest that the boundaries 
between them are always sharp. 
30 Hornsby and Langton 1998. 
31 Kukla 2014, 454. 
32 One might still worry, however, that other actions might count as silencing according to the 
account I have given. For instance, if you hang up the phone on a telemarketer, you prevent them 
from communicating. Although you have silenced them, on my view, you have not done so 
wrongfully (nor did you commit an act of violence, as will become clear in the next section).  
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knower and that to suffer from epistemic injustice is to be “wronged in one’s capacity as a 
knower.”33 But what does it mean to be wronged in that way? On Fricker’s view, there are two 
types of epistemic injustice: testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. Someone suffers testimonial 
injustice when their testimony is not assigned the degree of credibility that it warrants or when 
they are not recognized as a credible source of knowledge in virtue of their social location (owing 
to what she calls “identity prejudice”).34 So, if women are taken to be unreliable or to lack 
credibility with regard to certain types of knowledge claims, when a particular woman attempts to 
provide that type of knowledge, her efforts will likely fail to secure uptake. And, such lower levels 
of credibility need not only be assigned in virtue of particular types of knowledge; if women as a 
social group are seen to be unreliable or unknowledgeable, then women’s testimony will tend to 
fail to secure uptake across the board. Silencing, then, can be one form of testimonial injustice, in 
that the person who is silenced is prevented from communicating on the grounds that they are not 
credible sources of knowledge. 
The harm here is not merely the offense of not being heard, of not being recognized as 
someone whose testimony is (or even could be) veridical, but about the cumulative, developmental 
effects that such failure of recognition can have over time. In being effectively excluded from the 
community of knowers, one is prevented from “steadying the mind.”35 As essentially social beings, 
we constantly check our beliefs against the beliefs of others, confirming or disconfirming them in 
light of those of others whom we encounter.36 As Lisa Guenther argues in her work on the 
phenomenology of solitary confinement, we constantly rely on others to help us to solidify our 
beliefs that the world is the way that we understand it to be.37 Over time, when prevented from 
engaging in such confirmation, our faith in our own understanding of the world can erode, leaving 
us less sure of ourselves, our sensory perceptions, methods of reasoning, and memory, and so less 
able to go about making knowledge claims in the first place. In other words, each of those 
capacities can atrophy without use or can become distorted with misuse, and so epistemic isolation 
can leave one diminished in their capacity as a knower.38   
Testimonial injustice’s effects can be magnified when it leads to or is accompanied by 
hermeneutical injustice, which occurs when “some significant area of one’s social experience [is] 
obscured from collective understanding.”39 This is born from having been hermeneutically 
marginalized, which is the exclusion of a social group from participating in and contributing to the 
collective understanding.40 If you and others who share your social location are prevented 
systematically from contributing to the collective understanding, you’re likely to encounter many 
instances of mismatch between your perception of the world and the majority (or at least 
                                               
33 Fricker 2007, 44. 
34 Ibid., 28. 
35 Ibid., 53. 
36 Dotson 2014, 120-121. 
37 Guenther 2012 and 2017, 198-200. See also Pohlhaus 2013, 8. 
38 Kristie Dotson refers to this as “epistemic exclusion,” which is “an infringement on the 
epistemic agency of knowers that reduces her or his ability to participate in a given epistemic 
community.” She understands “epistemic agency” to be “the ability to utilize persuasively shared 
epistemic resources within a given epistemic community in order to participate in knowledge 
production and, if required, the revision of those same resources.” Dotson 2012, 24. 
39 Fricker 2007, 158. 
40 Ibid., 153. 
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epistemically dominant) group’s perception of the world.41 Silencing can contribute to or cause 
hermeneutical injustice, in that the person who is silenced is prevented from communicating their 
own experience and interpretation of the world. Their hermeneutical marginalization then is likely 
to compound, making it more and more difficult for them to be able to contribute to the collective 
understanding. 
Again, as with testimonial injustice, the harm is not merely offense at marginalization and 
exclusion (which is both appropriate and considerable) but the way in which, cumulatively and 
over time, suffering from hermeneutical injustice would cause you to lose trust in your own 
epistemic capacities. Someone who consistently experiences hermeneutical injustice might begin 
to feel “crazy,” to doubt their own perceptive and cognitive capacities, and to wonder whether they 
are able to form beliefs in a way that syncs up with the world as it actually is.42 
In short, suffering from epistemic injustice can make you less able to exercise your 
epistemic capacities across the board, including your imaginative and interpretive capacities, 
sensory capacities, and capacity to reason. Since those capacities are constitutive of your being a 
knower, and being a knower is essential to being a person, being subjected to epistemic injustice 
can have the effect of diminishing you as a person. Applying the account of violence I adopted 
earlier, it then makes sense to recognize that epistemic injustice is a form of violence when it has 
such effects. Since violence is the violation of the integrity of persons, and epistemic harms can 
violate an essential part of someone’s personhood, when someone is subjected to epistemic 
injustice (and it has the effect over time of violating their integrity) then they have been subjected 
to epistemic violence.43 And, when silencing is the method by which epistemic injustice is enacted 
or perpetuated, silencing becomes an act of violence. 
Though epistemic injustice is a form of violence - specifically epistemic violence - when 
it results in the violation of the integrity of persons, since not all instances of epistemic injustice 
have the effect of violating the integrity of persons, not all epistemic injustice is a form of violence. 
Whether epistemic injustice is a form of violence is determined by whether any person’s integrity 
is violated as a result, which depends on the context, the way epistemic injustice plays out within 
that context, and the personal constitution of those who are affected by it. 
Dotson has developed a different account of epistemic violence. She argues that successful 
communication relies on both the speaker and the hearer doing their parts, and that “to 
communicate we all need an audience willing and capable of hearing us.” (Emphasis in 
                                               
41 Dotson 2012, 40. 
42 See Fricker 2007, Chapter 7. Note that hermeneutical injustice is different from the practice of 
“gaslighting,” (though both hermeneutical injustice and gaslighting might well resemble each 
other in outcome) in which “[T]he gaslighter tries (consciously or not) to induce in someone the 
sense that her reactions, perceptions, memories, and/or beliefs are not just mistaken, but utterly 
without grounds – paradigmatically, so unfounded as to qualify as crazy.” Abramson 2014, 2. See 
also: McKinnon 2017. 
43 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak is widely credited with coining the term ‘epistemic violence,’ 
which centers on the way in which colonized subjects are constituted as the Other, thereby 
causing them not to be perceived as having epistemic agency at all. My account of epistemic 
violence is more inclusive and though it recognizes such an outcome as a form of potential 
epistemic violence (and certainly as testimonial injustice) it also includes other types of 
outcomes that Spivak’s account would likely not accommodate. Spivak, 1988. 
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original.)44 She then goes on to define epistemic violence as: “a failure of an audience to 
communicatively reciprocate, either intentionally or unintentionally, in linguistic exchanges owing 
to pernicious ignorance. Pernicious ignorance is a reliable ignorance or a counterfactual 
incompetence that, in a given context, is harmful.”45 Note that my view is more inclusive than 
Dotson’s in two ways. First, my view does not require that the audience suffer from pernicious 
ignorance. Second, and more important, my view is not focused in particular on some failure of 
the audience to hear, but instead allows that someone might be silenced in various ways that do 
not depend on the intended audience’s actions at all. Though I agree completely with Dotson that 
both ignorance and a failure to communicatively reciprocate will often cause epistemic violence, 
neither are necessary on my view. Instead, in adopting an outcome-based account of violence we 
determine whether violence has been done by asking whether a person’s integrity has been violated 
which can occur independently of prejudice on the part of the hearer or on the hearer’s failure to 
reciprocate. 
Just as Dotson’s view of epistemic violence is too restrictive (since it requires that 
epistemic violence be grounded in pernicious ignorance), so too is Fricker’s account of epistemic 
injustice too restrictive (since it requires that epistemic injustice be grounded in identity 
prejudice).46 As I have argued elsewhere, it is possible to cause the negative effects of epistemic 
injustice absent any identity prejudice.47 So, I contend that just as we should adopt an outcome-
based account of violence and silencing, so too should we adopt an outcome-based account of 
epistemic injustice. Or, barring that revision to Fricker’s account, we should at least recognize that 
acts of silencing that are not grounded in identity prejudice can cause the same effects for those 
who are silenced as epistemic injustice has on its victims. Since those effects violate the epistemic 
integrity of those who are subjected to them, silencing can sometimes do epistemic violence to 
someone, regardless of whether it adheres to a strict definition of epistemic injustice.  
Epistemic violence can be just as damaging as many forms of physical or psychological 
violence. It need not be inflicted intentionally (and indeed often is not). And, it can happen 
independently of any particular actor, but can instead be born from the everyday processes of 
normal life in an otherwise well-meaning society.48 Return to Case 2: if the professor does nothing 
to prevent women in their class from being excluded from the community of knowers, then even 
though the professor doesn’t believe that women ought to be attributed less credibility than men, 
women in the class might still suffer testimonial injustice as a result. In the same way 
hermeneutical injustice is also possible. In a case of an extremely powerful hegemonic ideology, 
it might be literally unimaginable for someone to conceive of the world in some other way. They 
might manage to endorse and recommend that ideology to others through countless actions and 
thereby perpetuate it without intending to.49 If that ideology is harmful and leaves those whose 
                                               
44 Dotson 2011, 238. 
45 Ibid., 242. 
46 Fricker notes that not all hermeneutical injustice must be grounded in identity prejudice, as 
when focused on what she calls “incidental hermeneutical injustice,” whereas “systematic 
hermeneutical injustice” is grounded in identity prejudice. That’s all the better for my view, since 
when focused on incidental hermeneutical injustice we are then directed to the outcome of the 
injustice, as I am arguing we should do for all types of epistemic injustice. Fricker 2007, 158. 
47 Emerick 2016. 
48 I here borrow from Iris Marion Young’s analysis of oppression. Young 1988, 271-272. 
49 Medina 2013, 96-109. 
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experience of the world fails to sync up with it worse off in a way that undermines their capacity 
as knowers, they do violence to others even though they not only don’t intend to, but cannot even 
imagine that their actions might do so.  
Note that, according to the outcome-based account of violence I have been developing, in 
a situation where someone is silenced but they do not suffer deleterious effects to their epistemic 
capacities, the silencing they experience is not an act of violence. This implication is one that some 
might find troubling. If someone is very confident and secure in their epistemic capacities and is 
not undermined by being silenced, then even if they are silenced, since their integrity has not been 
violated, violence has not been done to them. Return to Case 1, in which a speaker is prevented 
from giving a public talk at a college campus. The speaker might be very confident and sure of 
their epistemic capacities; though they might feel frustrated that they were prevented from 
speaking (either because their invitation was rescinded or because protests made their talk difficult 
to hear) they do not suffer a loss of faith in themselves. In that case they have not suffered violation, 
and so though they were silenced, that silencing was not an act of violence. That does not mean 
that the silencing to which they were subjected was not wrongful or in other ways harmful - it 
might very well be. Furthermore, it’s also important to recognize that, even though the speaker 
might not suffer epistemic violence in such a case, others who witness the silencing might not be 
so confident and secure in their epistemic capacities. If those capacities are diminished as a result 
of the speaker being silenced, those audience members might suffer collateral epistemic violence. 
Regardless of whether such collateral violence occurs, even though (on my view) some actions 
that we might commonly call violence turn out not to be (in so far as no actual violation of integrity 
occurs) that doesn’t mean that attempted violence should not be blamed, nor does it mean that acts 
that are unintentionally or accidentally acts of violence require blame; those remain open questions 
that requires additional argumentation and context. Similarly, consider a case in which one person 
attempts, but fails, to silence another. That they have neither silenced the other nor done epistemic 
violence to them does not mean that they have not acted wrongly; that also remains an open 
question. My point here is that for silencing to be an act of violence, it must result in violation of 
integrity. The question of whether silencing someone in a way that causes epistemic violence is 
wrongful is the one to which I will now turn. 
 
4. When to Silence Others 
 
There are many good reasons to silence someone. Consider, for instance, standard 
examples of what are commonly taken to be acceptable legal limitations of free speech, like the 
fact that it is illegal to disingenuously shout “fire” in a crowded place, or for someone who knows 
classified information to share it with the press, or for doctors to disclose sensitive information 
about their patients. Teachers and professors also silence their students in various ways. They 
prevent their students from communicating many things in class discussion by helping them stay 
on topic if they start to wander and by telling some talkative students they need to be quiet to create 
space for less talkative students to contribute. Finally, parents and guardians limit their children’s 
time on social media or their phones thereby preventing them from communicating freely. 
All three sets of examples illustrate that it is uncontroversial to think that it can be morally 
appropriate for someone to be silenced, either because doing so promotes the greater good 
(preventing someone from shouting “fire,” sharing classified information), because doing so 
prevents the violation of others’ rights (patients’ rights to privacy, quiet students’ rights to take part 
in class discussion, and all students’ rights to have that discussion be a productive and effective 
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learning environment), or because it is in the best interests of the person who is silenced (limiting 
a child’s access to social media). So, though silencing sounds bad (and often is bad) it is often 
positively good (as well as totally mundane).   
I suggest instead that it is not silencing simpliciter to which we should object, but silencing 
that does epistemic violence to others. There are additional, instrumental reasons to object to 
silencing, like concerns about an overly interventionist state or the ways in which social and 
scientific knowledge might be hindered as a result, but I won’t explore them here. Instead, my 
purpose is to focus just on the claim that silencing can be an act of epistemic violence. Why worry 
about that silencing in particular? For the same reason that we should worry about violence in all 
its forms. If violence is the violation of a person’s integrity, and persons are intrinsically valuable, 
then all violence is prima facie bad; if we lived in an entirely just and morally perfect world then 
there would be, at the least, no nonconsensual violence.50 But, we do not live in such a world and 
the prima facie reason not to commit violence is trumped by other sometimes stronger factors, like 
the right to defend yourself from violence and the obligation to protect others from violence.51  
In appealing to both the right of self-defense and the obligation to defend another, I am 
assuming that, in such cases, the only way to protect yourself and others is by committing acts of 
violence. But, in those cases, though violence is bad, it is still permissible or obligatory. Since 
silencing can, in some circumstances, violate a person’s integrity (undermining their epistemic 
capacities in a way that undermines their personhood), and since some types of speech have the 
effect of silencing others, in those circumstances where you must silence someone in order to 
protect yourself or others, you ought to even if doing so will be an act of epistemic violence. 
Consider again Case 2: given background sexist ideologies, it is all too easy for women to 
feel as if they don’t belong in a college environment in general, or in a specific class or discipline 
in particular. Imagine that, as a result of systematic exposure to such ideologies (and the jokes and 
comments in Case 2 that help to perpetuate them), a student comes to doubt herself deeply and to 
lose trust in her epistemic capacities, such that her epistemic integrity is diminished and rendered 
unstable.52 In short, she becomes less of a knower, and since being a knower is an essential part of 
being a person, her integrity as a person is undermined. That student suffers, in short, from 
epistemic violence by way of testimonial injustice as a result of having been silenced by those who 
use such language. The professor has an obligation to try to prevent such violence; is it permissible 
for them to do so by silencing others who would use such language in class, even if doing so would 
constitute epistemic violence for those silenced in the long run?  
Things become more complicated when we recognize that it’s not just particular terms (like 
sexist language) that have can have such an effect; some views, even when expressed in ways that 
appear to be polite or follow norms of decorum, are themselves likely to be silencing. Consider, 
for instance, the sexist stereotype that women are bad at math; even if a particular math teacher is 
not sexist and conducts class in a gender-neutral way, it’s likely that at least some women in the 
                                               
50 For instance, one might believe that contact sports like boxing are permissible, so long as they 
are consensual. 
51 In making such assumptions I am rejecting pacifism, which says that violence is never 
justified. 
52 I want to be clear that many students who experience that type of environment do not come to 
doubt themselves in this way and so do not suffer this type of violence. But, at least one reason 
why we should be concerned about creating an inclusive learning community is to avoid this 
type of epistemic atrophy. 
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class will still be silenced by stereotype threat and the norm that says that “people like them” don’t 
have anything to contribute to conversations like those held in class.53 If others in the class make 
jokes that tread on that stereotype, or circulate news articles that claim to have discovered why 
women are bad at math, should the professor prevent the expression or discussion of the view?  
I hope to have demonstrated that while a great deal of silencing is unobjectionable, one 
primary reason why silencing becomes problematic is when it is an act of epistemic violence. But, 
I have also taken for granted that it is sometimes permissible to use violence to prevent other 
violence, either directed at yourself or another, at least when there are no other options available. 
At the same time, as I have argued in defending an outcome-based account of violence, we often 
don’t know in advance when an action will do violence to another. And, when we recognize that 
silencing can sometimes be an act of violence (even if unintentionally so) how does someone know 
when they ought to silence another? I don’t intend here to offer a one-size fits all answer. Instead, 
what follows is a list of general factors that ought to be considered when trying to decide whether 
silencing that does violence to another would be justified in a particular case: 
- Someone’s speech would likely cause epistemic violence or be otherwise harmful to others; 
- The speaker would be culpable for the epistemic violence or harm they cause (because they 
should know better); 
- Silencing would be beneficial to the speaker (in that you prevent them from committing 
culpable epistemic violence against another); 
- Silencing someone better serves an underlying commitment to communication, better 
promotes the flourishing of the epistemic community, or enhances (rather than undermines) 
speech in general; 
- Silencing prevents the communication of speech that would promote injustice by 
contributing to unjust ideologies that are likely to do violence to subordinated social 
groups; 
- Silencing promotes hermeneutical justice by allowing those who might otherwise be 
hermeneutically marginalized to contribute to the collective understanding, thereby 
promoting a more complete, less partial and distorted collective understanding of the 
world;54 
- Silencing would do the least amount of harm or violate the fewest duties and rights of all 
those affected. 
 
I do not claim that this list is exhaustive, nor do I claim that each one of these factors would 
always outweigh all other considerations in all contexts. Furthermore, I do not claim that whether 
any of these factors will obtain is always knowable; indeed, as is very often the case in trying to 
act rightly you run a moral risk in which your efforts might end up doing more harm than good. 
But, since it is the case that refraining from action is itself action, opting out altogether is not an 
option. In light of that fact, it is my hope that in trying to answer the thorny and painful questions 
exemplified by the four cases with which I began, these desiderata are morally and politically 
useful. 
The advocate for the unfettered right to free speech might reply that we could easily avoid 
the difficulty of such questions by being willing to risk causing epistemic violence and pursuing 
truth wherever it goes, independent of such moral or political consequences. This is the wrong 
                                               
53 Spencer, Steele, and Quinn, 1999. 
54 Jaggar 1983, Chapter 11; Dotson 2012, 40; Dotson 2014, 127. 
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approach to take, in part because as feminist epistemologists have spent decades demonstrating, 
there is no neutral place to stand in choosing which questions to ask or which lines of discussion 
to pursue. What that means is that in choosing to throw open the door and allow all conversations 
to take place while recognizing that some conversations will do epistemic violence to members of 
particular social groups, you in fact take not a neutral position, but one that perpetuates existing 
injustice. In short, if you grant that silencing can be an act of violence but you claim that we should 
ignore moral and political considerations like those I named above, then you do take a side, despite 





In this chapter I have defended the claim that silencing can be an act of epistemic violence. 
Though I believe that it can and that it is one that is very common, we should not despair. In 
adopting an outcome-based account of violence we saw that silencing becomes an act of violence 
when someone’s epistemic agency is violated. Since such violation often (though not always) 
occurs as a result of systematic and repetitive instances of epistemic harm over time, I remain 
hopeful about the ways in which we can shore up each other’s epistemic capacities and help each 
other to become less vulnerable to violation. Indeed, in the long run it should be the goal of those 
working to promote social justice to bring about a world in which everyone is deeply confident in 
their own epistemic abilities and where no ideologies would tread on anyone’s social location in a 
way that would leave anyone vulnerable to epistemic violence. That is not to say that we ought to 
aim for the type of individualistic imperviousness that my critic might claim everyone ought to 
pull themselves up by their epistemic bootstraps to achieve. It is instead to note that it is precisely 
because we are fundamentally social beings who are susceptible to the influence of others that we 
should work to create the conditions where everyone is able to trust themselves in a way that would 
render all disagreement free of violence. Whether we could ever achieve such a world remains an 
open question. In “the unjust meantime,”55 some views ought to be silenced in order to avoid 
foreclosing that possibility. 
  
                                               
55 I here borrow Alison Jaggar’s apt phrase to note that what actions and policies we ought to 
pursue in a perfectly just world are often different from those we ought to pursue in a world like 
ours, which is shot through with injustice. Jaggar 2009, 145. 
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